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Pandemic inﬂ  uenza planning is well under way across 
the globe. Antiviral drugs and vaccines have dominated the 
therapeutic agenda. Far less work has been conducted on 
stockpiling and planning for deployment of antimicrobial 
drugs against secondary bacterial pneumonia, a cause of 
substantial illness and death in previous pandemics and ep-
idemics. In the event of a pandemic, effective antimicrobial 
drug measures are expected to substantially beneﬁ  t public 
health. We address issues regarding use of antimicrobial 
drugs as stocks of individual agents are diminished and the 
role of resistance surveillance in informing such policy. Fur-
thermore, vaccination with polysaccharide and conjugate 
pneumococcal vaccines is considered as part of a pandemic 
strategy. Most illness and death from inﬂ  uenza are likely to 
occur in developing countries, where neuraminidase inhibi-
tors and vaccines may be neither affordable nor available; 
thus, compared with industrialized countries, the beneﬁ  ts of 
treating bacterial complications in developing countries may 
be substantially greater.
T
he threat of a pandemic has been raised by the recent 
emergence of avian inﬂ  uenza virus (H5N1) in South-
east Asia. If an inﬂ  uenza pandemic of the same magnitude 
and severity as the one in 1918–19 were to occur in the 
present day, worldwide an estimated 51–81 million persons 
would die (1).
To date, antiviral drugs, principally the neuraminidase 
inhibitors, and vaccines have dominated the pharmaceuti-
cal countermeasures agenda in terms of research and de-
velopment, stockpiling, and planning for mass deployment. 
However, the global supply of neuraminidase inhibitors is 
likely to be limited, and an immunogenic vaccine matched 
speciﬁ  cally to the pandemic strain would take at least 4–6 
months to produce. Effective public health measures are 
predicted to slow, rather than halt, the spread of infection. 
Large numbers of inﬂ  uenza cases are therefore likely to oc-
cur when a pandemic strain emerges.
Evidence from laboratory, clinical, and epidemiologic 
studies suggests that bacterial co-infection contributes sub-
stantially to the illness and death that occurs in pandemic 
and seasonal inﬂ  uenza. We consider bacterial co-infection 
in the context of current preparedness activities and guide-
lines regarding antimicrobial drug stockpiling and deploy-
ment, including reference to existing quinolone stockpiles 
held by a number of countries. We also discuss the poten-
tial role of vaccination against Streptococcus pneumoniae 
in the context of pandemic inﬂ  uenza.
Bacterial Pneumonia and Pandemic Inﬂ  uenza
Ecologic studies have demonstrated temporal relation-
ships between inﬂ  uenza activity and bacterial pneumonia. 
This association was perhaps most strikingly emphasized 
by the 20th-century pandemics, which have been compre-
hensively reviewed by Brundage (2). Substantial laboratory 
evidence for synergism between inﬂ  uenza A and bacterial 
agents has been reviewed by McCullers (3).
Bacterial Pneumonia and Seasonal Inﬂ  uenza
Pandemics are relatively rare; therefore, more data are 
available about bacterial infections associated with season-
al than pandemic inﬂ  uenza A strains. Secondary bacterial 
pneumonia is a common cause of death in persons with sea-
sonal inﬂ  uenza; co-infections have been found with ≈25% 
of all inﬂ  uenza-related deaths (4,5). Pathogen-speciﬁ  c data 
are summarized below.
Streptococcus pneumoniae
Of laboratory-conﬁ  rmed cases of community-acquired 
pneumonia,  ≈30% involve bacterial–viral co-infection 
(6–8). S. pneumonia is the most common cause of commu-
nity-acquired pneumonia and bacterial co-infection with in-
ﬂ  uenza A (9–12). Invasive pneumococcal disease is a term 
used when the organism is isolated from a typically sterile 
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site, such as blood or pleural ﬂ  uid. This deﬁ  nition therefore 
underestimates pneumococcal pneumonia where isolation 
of the organism is not possible (13). Notwithstanding, a 
number of studies have documented the temporal associa-
tion between inﬂ  uenza and invasive pneumococcal disease, 
which suggests synergism. Grabowska et al. (14) recently 
used 2 epidemiologic methods based on Swedish surveil-
lance data to estimate the excess cases of invasive pneu-
mococcal pneumonia associated with seasonal inﬂ  uenza at 
12%–30%.
HIV-infected children have a 40× greater risk than 
HIV-noninfected children for invasive pneumococcal dis-
ease and account for most cases of invasive pneumococcal 
disease in certain sub-Saharan African countries (13,15). 
HIV-infected children and adults would likely be more se-
verely affected by an inﬂ  uenza pandemic.
Staphylococcus aureus (Methicillin Sensitive 
and Methicillin Resistant)
A retrospective study of inﬂ  uenza-related childhood 
deaths in the United States in the 2003–04 season found S. 
aureus to be the most common bacterial agent, accounting 
for 46% of isolates, >50% of which were methicillin-re-
sistant strains (5). Surveillance for severe inﬂ  uenza-related 
S. aureus community-acquired pneumonia in the United 
States during the 2003-04 season recorded 17 cases (88% 
methicillin-resistant S. aureus [MRSA]) and 5 deaths (4 
with MRSA) and a median age of 21 years (16); laboratory 
evidence of inﬂ  uenza infection was available for ≈75%. 
More recently, 10 cases of severe community-acquired 
MRSA pneumonia in children (6 of whom died) from 2 
southern states in a 2-month period were reported (17). For 
30% of those patients, MRSA was recovered from sputum 
only, and 4 had a documented recent history of MRSA skin 
infection in themselves or in a close contact. Preceding 
staphylococcal skin disease in persons with staphylococcal 
pneumonia was described by Goslings et al. (18) during 
the 1957–58 pandemic. In the context of emerging com-
munity-acquired MRSA skin infection in persons without 
traditional risk factors, this association has substantial im-
plications for possible emergence of MRSA pneumonia in 
a future pandemic (19).
Other Pathogens
A recent study from New Zealand (7) that aimed to 
characterize viral causes of community-acquired pneumo-
nia reported viral–bacterial co-infection in 45 (15%) of 304 
hospitalized patients. S. pneumoniae (67%) and Haemo-
philus inﬂ  uenzae (11%) were the 2 pathogens most com-
monly associated with inﬂ  uenza A infection; atypical mi-
crobes (Chlamydia pneumoniae, Mycoplasma pneumoniae, 
and Legionella pneumophila) were also well represented 
(22%). These ﬁ  gures are generally consistent with other 
published data; group A streptococci are a rare but serious 
cause of community-acquired pneumonia (20) and have 
been associated with fatal cases of inﬂ  uenza (5).
Stockpiling and Strategic Use 
of Antimicrobial Drugs 
In most modern healthcare systems, which increasingly 
emphasize just-in-time supply chains, shortages of antimi-
crobial drugs may occur rapidly unless more are stockpiled. 
These shortages would limit the treatment of secondary 
bacterial infections in the middle and the later stages of a 
pandemic. For this reason a range of antimicrobial drug op-
tions have been suggested, taking into account the likely 
limitations of availability in diagnostics for community-
acquired pneumonia and the fact that, because of the sheer 
number of patients, therapy is likely to be empirical. Clini-
cal management guidelines for pandemic inﬂ  uenza have 
recommended amoxicillin + clavulanate or doxycycline 
(21); third-generation cephalosporins or respiratory ﬂ  uo-
roquinolones (22); and second-generation cephalosporins, 
macrolides, doxycycline, or co-trimoxazole (23) as ﬁ  rst-
line empirical therapies for community-acquired pneumo-
nia associated with pandemic inﬂ  uenza. Dependent on the 
extent of any stockpile, shortages of these preferred agents 
might occur ﬁ  rst during a pandemic. 
In the United States, the emergence of community-
acquired MRSA has prompted revision to include van-
comycin and other agents as empirical therapy for severe 
cases (21,22). The demand created by empirical use of van-
comycin in such cases, the limited number of alternative 
agents, and the limited global production capacity of this 
drug are likely to lead to its shortage. Other treatment pos-
sibilities include linezolid, quinopristin/dalfopristin, and 
tigecycline.
Fortunately, in the United Kingdom most MRSA iso-
lates are sensitive to doxycycline (95% of respiratory iso-
lates; Health Protection Agency [HPA], unpub. data) and 
rifampin (97%; HPA, unpub. data); fewer are sensitive to 
trimethoprim (72%). Less severe MRSA infections treated 
with these widely available and inexpensive drugs would 
be expected to respond. Rifampin and cotrimoxazole are 
widely produced in developing countries, where the preva-
lence of tuberculosis and HIV infection are high.
Real-time Surveillance of Pathogen Resistance 
After a country has committed to acquiring a stockpile 
of antimicrobial drugs, several important practical and lo-
gistic issues arise. The ﬁ  rst is deciding on the range of an-
timicrobial drugs to be stockpiled. After the World Health 
Organization declares a global pandemic phase 5 alert, an-
timicrobial drug supplies will be quickly depleted as coun-
tries scour the global market to build up stocks. The choice 
of available agents may be limited by this stage; therefore, 
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procuring in advance is sensible, although this involves 
predicting which bacterial agents will be of greatest impor-
tance. The UK HPA has developed a program of real-time 
surveillance of antimicrobial susceptibility for the 3 most 
likely inﬂ  uenza-related bacterial pneumonia pathogens: S. 
pneumoniae, H. inﬂ  uenzae, and S. aureus. Contemporane-
ous data are available for each pathogen, enabling recom-
mendation of antimicrobial drugs on the basis of the pro-
portion of respiratory tract isolates likely to be susceptible 
at a particular point in time. Such real-time data may be 
useful for guiding the evolution of pandemic antimicrobial 
drug treatment policy in order to optimize the use of scarce 
antimicrobial drugs by drawing on a range of different 
agents according to national stock availability at the time. 
The surveillance program may also provide early warning 
of likely clinical failures caused by emerging resistance.
Size, Storage, and Turnover of Stockpiles
Decisions about pandemic stockpiles, procurements, 
and size depend primarily on ﬁ  nancial considerations. De-
cision-makers must bear in the mind the need not only to 
purchase the initial stockpile but also to maintain it, per-
haps for a sustained period. In most circumstances, stock-
piles of vaccines for inﬂ  uenza virus subtype H5N1 and 
neuraminidase inhibitors are reserved exclusively for use 
during or immediately before a pandemic; they are not in-
tended for day-to-day use on the same scale. In contrast, 
antimicrobial drugs are widely used every day. This dif-
ference means that antimicrobial drugs could act as buffer 
stock (conceptually similar to vendor-managed inventory) 
in most healthcare systems, rather than a true stockpile. 
Indeed, the word stockpile may be a misnomer in relation 
to increased stores of antimicrobial drugs because these 
drugs can be channeled into day-to-day use and replaced 
through fresh procurement. Thus, over time the amount, 
proportion, and range of these agents held can be slowly 
altered. These 2 mechanisms, ongoing interpandemic use 
and restocking, make such a stockpile far less vulnerable 
than antiviral drugs to expiration before use and far more 
responsive to changes in antimicrobial drug sensitivity de-
tected between the date of procurement and the onset of the 
next pandemic.
Further considerations relate to storage. Whereas anti-
viral drugs and vaccines essentially need to be held in se-
cure centralized storage (the latter within the cold chain) 
until eventual deployment, antimicrobial drugs can be held, 
at least in part, lower down the supply chain by wholesalers 
and community pharmacies or their equivalent.
Additionally, the proportion of pandemic inﬂ  uenza 
cases that will progress to bacterial complications needs 
to be estimated. The difﬁ  culty in making such an estimate 
relates partly to the paucity of contemporary data that spe-
ciﬁ  cally describe the incidence of bacterial complications 
after inﬂ  uenza and partly to the fact that widespread use 
of neuraminidase inhibitors, rarely used for seasonal inﬂ  u-
enza, might reduce the development of antimicrobial drug–
related complications by 25%–40% (24,25). Data from the 
extensive reviews by Brundage and Soper suggest that in 
the 3 pandemics of the 20th century, bacterial pneumonia 
developed in 15%–20% of inﬂ  uenza patients (2,26); some 
estimates for seasonal inﬂ  uenza are far higher (27). It can 
be argued that in 1918 the primary viral infection was so 
virulent that it caused the premature demise of some pa-
tients who might otherwise have survived long enough for 
bacterial pneumonia to develop; i.e., the reported frequen-
cy of bacterial complications was spuriously low. Coupled 
with a population clinical attack rate that will most likely 
lie in the range of 25% to 50%, an antimicrobial drug stock-
pile is likely to be needed for a minimum of 10% of the 
population. This ﬁ  gure does not account for wastage, mis-
diagnosis (if, as is most likely, prescribing is based on clini-
cal suspicion alone), or a higher rate of secondary bacterial 
complication than expected; it is also based on a strategy of 
treatment only.
Treatment and Prophylaxis Strategies
Alternative strategies include offering antimicrobial 
drug prophylaxis at the same time as antiviral treatment to 
patients with conditions that put them at high risk, such as 
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease. Antimicrobial drugs 
(or a prescription for them) could be issued to high-risk pa-
tients at the same time as antiviral treatment. The ability 
to start antimicrobial drug therapy with minimal delay and 
without the need for repeat consultation if antiviral drugs 
alone are not effective might be advantageous in an already 
overstretched health system. Both of these strategies incor-
porate further uncertainty because the high-risk groups in 
a pandemic are unknown and may not correspond to those 
currently recognizable for seasonal inﬂ  uenza; if anything, 
the high-risk groups are more likely than not to be larger in 
a pandemic. This might increase the requirement for anti-
microbial drug stockpiling to 25% population coverage.
Each country should estimate its own needs. Country-
speciﬁ  c factors to take into account include treatment strat-
egy (treatment alone or treatment and prophylaxis), health 
service conﬁ  guration, historical use of antimicrobial drugs, 
physician behavior, inappropriate prescribing linked to 
misdiagnosis, and the availability of antiviral drugs.
Quinolone Stockpiles
A large number of countries hold stockpiles of quino-
lones, in particular ciproﬂ  oxacin, as a contingency against 
bioterrorist threats. In the United Kingdom, ciproﬂ  oxacin 
is active against all H. inﬂ  uenzae isolates (≈100% of re-
cent UK respiratory tract isolates susceptible; HPA, unpub. 
data), most methicillin-sensitive S. aureus isolates (≈82%), 
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and atypical organisms. Therefore, if these bacterial patho-
gens were known or suspected to predominate in inﬂ  uenza-
related pneumonia associated with a future pandemic, the 
use of ciproﬂ  oxacin might be justiﬁ  ed, and agents effec-
tive against MRSA would be reserved for severe cases and 
those with culture-conﬁ  rmed MRSA (99% of UK respira-
tory MRSA isolates, most of which are hospital acquired, 
are quinolone resistant; HPA, unpub. data).
However, ciproﬂ   oxacin activity against S. pneumo-
niae (28) is only intermediate, and a signiﬁ  cant number of 
bacterial pneumonias complicating inﬂ  uenza may not re-
spond to empirical treatment. This fact is well supported by 
evidence from mouse models; more modern “respiratory” 
ﬂ  uoroquinolones such as gatiﬂ  oxacin demonstrate good re-
sults (29) against S. pneumoniae, which was not always so 
for ciproﬂ  oxacin. Therefore, in a pandemic empirical cip-
roﬂ  oxacin use could be justiﬁ  ed only if all other more suit-
able antimicrobial drug supplies were exhausted.
Given ciproﬂ  oxacin’s weak activity against pneumo-
cocci, reserving its use in a pandemic to empirical treatment 
of persons previously vaccinated against pneumococcal in-
fection, who would be at reduced risk for co-infection with 
this particular organism, would be reasonable. Theoretical 
support for this hypothesis comes from the United States, 
where use of a 7-valent conjugate vaccine since 2000 has 
resulted in declining invasive pneumococcal disease (30) 
and relatively infrequent inﬂ  uenza-related deaths caused by 
pneumococci in children (5). A strategic approach might in-
volve the use of ciproﬂ  oxacin in fully immunized persons.
Pneumococcal Vaccination Strategies
Including a vaccination strategy in pandemic planning 
would potentially reduce the amount of disease caused by 
secondary S. pneumoniae bacterial pneumonia. We have 
already described this pathogen’s role in community-ac-
quired pneumonia and inﬂ  uenza complications. The public 
health beneﬁ  t from vaccination could be substantial.
Pneumococcal polysaccharide vaccine (PPV) is cur-
rently recommended in many countries for persons >65 
years of age and for high-risk groups of all ages. Few spe-
ciﬁ  c data exist on the effectiveness of PPV for reducing 
pneumococcal pneumonia–associated illness and death 
after infection with inﬂ  uenza A virus. Furthermore, in the 
context of pneumococcal disease not speciﬁ  cally associated 
with inﬂ  uenza, use of PPV has protected against invasive 
pneumococcal disease but not against pneumococcal pneu-
monia in the absence of bacteremia (31). Therefore, on the 
basis of current evidence, prior PPV administration could 
not reliably be used to identify persons who could receive 
empirical ciproﬂ  oxacin therapy for bacterial pneumonia as 
a complication of inﬂ  uenza. It could, however, be used as 
a large-scale preventive measure against invasive pneumo-
coccal disease in adults.
The protective efﬁ  cacy of a 9-valent pneumococcal 
conjugate vaccine (PncCV) against nonbacteremic pneu-
monia as well as invasive pneumococcal disease has been 
demonstrated in 37,107 children from South Africa among 
whom the prevalence of HIV infection was 6.5% (32).The 
vaccine also substantially reduced the incidence of ﬁ  rst epi-
sodes of invasive pneumococcal disease that were resistant 
to penicillin or trimethoprim-sulfamethoxazole.
PncCV may have more greatly reduced the incidence 
of pneumonia in children when a virus was isolated (33). 
This effect was more pronounced when inﬂ  uenza A was 
isolated; protective efﬁ  cacy was 41% (95% conﬁ  dence in-
terval 13%–60%). The study provided indirect evidence 
of the frequency of pneumococcal superinfection of viral 
pneumonias in children in this setting. If similar results 
could be achieved through vaccination before an inﬂ  uenza 
pandemic, the beneﬁ  ts of preventing pneumococcal com-
plications could be substantial. The introduction of conju-
gate vaccine in the United States in 2000 has led to a de-
cline in invasive pneumococcal disease in not only children 
but also adults; reduction was 32% for those 20–39 years of 
age and 18% for those >65 years (30). Therefore, vaccina-
tion of children might be the most cost-effective policy. In 
September 2006, the United Kingdom started vaccinating 
children from the age of 2 months; early unpublished data 
(minutes from the Joint Committee on Vaccination and Im-
munisation meeting on February 14, 2007, available from 
www.advisorybodies.doh.gov.uk/jcvi/mins140207.htm) 
suggest that invasive pneumococcal disease in children <2 
years of age is already reduced.
The use of PncCV in children and 23-valent PPV in 
adults as part of a pandemic strategy would be consistent 
with recommendations resulting from current published 
data. However, such use may still not allow for ciproﬂ  oxa-
cin stockpiles to be reliably targeted for speciﬁ  c popula-
tions, given the lack of protection against nonbacteremic 
pneumoccal pneumonia associated with PPV. If conjugate 
vaccine were used in all patients (although no convinc-
ing data exist to support efﬁ  cacy of conjugate vaccine in 
adults), ciproﬂ  oxacin might be more reliably targeted at a 
group more likely to have a nonpneumococcal pneumonia. 
However, a conjugate vaccine is likely to be expensive and 
limited in serotype coverage, and approval for its use in 
adults will take time.
Discussion
Substantial laboratory and epidemiologic evidence 
shows that inﬂ  uenza A and bacterial pathogens often partic-
ipate in the pathogenesis of pneumonia. Several issues need 
to be considered with regard to antimicrobial drug treatment 
for large numbers of patients who have secondary bacterial 
infection during a pandemic. Real-time antimicrobial drug–
resistance surveillance programs could be incorporated into 
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preparedness frameworks; information from such networks 
could result in stockpiling of inexpensive, generically man-
ufactured antimicrobial drugs. Vaccination against pneu-
mococcal disease, particularly vaccination of HIV-infected 
persons, potentially will save lives in the short term as well 
as provide protection in the event of a pandemic.
Dr Gupta is an infectious diseases physician undergoing 
postgraduate specialist medical training. He is currently conduct-
ing research on HIV resistance in developing-world settings and 
has an interest in pandemic inﬂ  uenza preparedness.
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